- Did the CIA Sabotage Russia At The Olympics?
Authored by Rick Sterling via Oriental Review,
There is something very fishy about the Anti Doping Rule Violations (ADRVs) pinned on the Russian curler and Russian bobsledder during the final week of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics.
It makes no logical sense that an athlete would do a one-time consumption of a chemical that is of no value in circumstances where it is almost certain to be detected with huge negative consequences.
That is precisely the situation. The Russian Mixed Curling bronze medal winner, Alexander Krushelnitsky, had to give up his medal, plus that of his partner wife, because traces of meldonium were found in his urine sample. He had previously tested clean. Meldonium is a medication which helps keep the heart healthy by increasing blood flow. That would be of no benefit in a sport like curling which requires accuracy, strategy and focus but is not taxing physically. The “sweeping” to help guide the rock down the ice lasts only 20 seconds or less. International curlers were astounded at the news and bemused at the idea of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) for curling. The skip of the Danish curling team said ”I think most people will laugh and ask, ‘what could you possibly need doping for?”
Krushelnitsky strongly denies taking banned drugs. “I am categorically opposed to doping …. never, at any time that I have been involved in sport, have I ever used prohibited substances”.
Russian curling team Alexander Krushelnitsky and Anastasia Bryzgalova
Similar curious circumstances apply in the second ADRV. Russian bobsledder Nadezhda Sergeeva had numerous negative (clean) tests before she was tested positive for banned trimetazidine. Bobsledding is another sport which requires physical and mental skill but not physical endurance.
In the February 25 IOC meeting to close the Pyeongchang Winter Games, the head of the IOC Implementation Group, Nicole Hoevertz, said the Russian athletes had been tested “more than any other athletes”. She and her group were convinced that the 168 member Russian athletic team was clean. At about 82:00 in the video, she says the two Russian doping violations were “so peculiar.” She introduced the IOC Medical and Scientific Director, Dr. Richard Bludgett, to provide more detail. He suggested that meldonium would not be of benefit in curling. He then went further and suggested the ADRV regarding trimetazidine may be in error. He said trimetazidine “is a substance where there is a parent compound which is a common headache migraine treatment available particularly in China and Japan and if that is found then it is not considered an ADRV. And if there is a very low level, as there was in this case, that is a possibility.”
Sergeeva denies ever taking banned drugs and even went on social media with a T-shirt declaring her commitment to clean sport.
Russian bobsledder Nadezhda Sergeeva.
In summary, it seems highly unlikely that two different Russian athletes would intentionally take medications that have no benefit but which are almost guaranteed to be detected resulting in huge harm to them and their team.
Who Benefits?
Another possibility is that meldonium or trimetazidine powder was surreptitiously put in the food of the athletes. This one time consumption would cause a positive test.
In fact there are forces on the international scene who are pleased that Russia has been battling defamation and charges of “state sponsored doping” for the past two years. They want the current denigration and punishments of Russia to continue, perhaps influencing Russia’s upcoming national election and undermining Russia’s hosting of the Football World Cup this summer.
One such group is the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA has a long history of big and small criminal deeds. Presumably it would not be difficult for them to infiltrate Olympic facilities or bribe a corrupt individual to put traces of meldonium or another powder in someone’s food or drink.
Those who quickly dismiss this possibility probably also thought that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction in 2002. That was a false claim supported by evidence fabricated by the CIA.
It is well documented the CIA carries out murders, coups and major sabotage. The CIA has documented some of their methods in “The Official CIA Manual of Trickery and Deception”. They don’t just carry out assassinations and coups. In the book “In Search of Enemies”, former CIA officer John Stockwell documented how the CIA created a false story about Cuban soldiers raping Angolan women to defame Cuba.
Corrupt police forces sometimes plant evidence on a suspect they wish to convict. It would be essentially the same thing to get a Russian athlete to ingest spiked food or beverage.
The CIA has motive and expressed intent:
* In contrast with Russian leaders who call the US a “partner”, US officials increasingly call Russia an “adversary”. The latest US National Security Strategy explicitly says they intend to respond to Russia as an adversary: “ The United States will respond to the growing political, economic and military competitions we face around the world. China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”
* Despite the lack of clear evidence, there is widespread belief that Russia “meddled” in the US election. The anti-Russia sentiment has been fanned into the exaggerated claim that the unproven Russian action was “an act of war, an act of hybrid warfare”.
* Neoconservatives forces openly talk about “punishing” Russia. The former Deputy Director of the CIA, Michael Morrell, said “We need to make the Russians pay a price” . He confirmed on public television that means killing Russians (and Iranians) in Syria. This is the 33 year veteran CIA leader who publicly campaigned for Hillary Clinton.
Did the CIA plant the doping evidence? We don’t know for certain but it should not be dismissed out of hand. The CIA has the means, opportunity and above all the motive to falsely implicate Russians in new doping cases with the goal of preventing Russia from getting beyond the international sporting sanctions and punishments. They have done vastly more deceitful, manipulative, and outrageous things than this.
Media Bias
Unfortunately, western media will not investigate this possibility. Western media cannot even accurately report on events like the IOC meeting yesterday. The fact that the head of the IOC Implementation Group warmly praised the Russian participation at the Pyeongchang Olympics is not mentioned in western media. The fact that Dr. Bludgett raised questions about the accuracy of the ADRVs against Russia is not mentioned in reports from NY Times, the UK Guardian or Inside the Games. Instead, the writer at Inside the Games once again exaggerated the voice of critics of Russia as he downplayed the voices of international athletes who want to put the doping scandal behind and move forward.
Western media have reported deceptively that the Russian athletes have “admitted” to the violations. In fact, both Russian athletes strongly deny taking banned drugs.
Western media bias is also shown in the focus on alleged Russian doping and minimization or ignoring of other possible violations. For example the story about the Norwegian cross-country ski team and their use of banned asthmatic medications. They get around the restrictions by having their doctor claim that most of their athletes are asthmatic. This situation is a result of the inconsistent rules and regulations. A Therapeutic Use Exemption (TUE) can be given to any athlete designated by a doctor and in secrecy. They are not required to publicly disclose this, giving incentive to corruption and misuse.
Richard McLaren’s Bias
The World Anti Doping Agency (WADA) has also been biased. Over one year ago, their investigator Richard McLaren claimed “over one thousand Russian athletes benefited” from the alleged Russian conspiracy to cheat the ant-doping system. McLaren said the proof would be provided to the various sport federations.
In September 2017 it was revealed that charges had been filed against 96 athletes. Of these, WADA cleared 95 athletes of wrongdoing; only one athlete was proven to be in violation. More recently, the Court of Arbitration in Sport completely overturned the bans on 28 Russian athletes.
In summary, it appears that McLaren’s accusation about “over one thousand athletes benefiting” was a huge exaggeration or fabrication.
Where Do Things Go From Here?
The IOC Executive Board has indicated they intend to lift the suspension of the Russian Olympic Committee if no more “anti doping rule violations” are found in the last batch of athlete samples from the Pyeongchang Olympics. The results are expected in a few days.
Another ADRV may appear. If so, that will greatly complicate the effort to reintegrate Russian athletics. Even if the final tests are all clean, those who oppose Russia will continue trying to delay or prevent the full integration of Russia within the world sporting Community.
The former Moscow Laboratory Director Grigory Rodchenkov is the primary weapon in the campaign accusing Russia of “state sponsored doping”. “Icarus” is a movie about him which has received huge funding and promotion. It is nominated for an an Oscar Academy award. This will serve the campaign well.
The Russians have been accused of trying to murder Rodchenkov. But if he suddenly dies one day, it is more likely to be by the CIA. At this point, Rodchenkov has done all the damage he can to Russian sports. The only thing he could possibly do is to recant or fall apart. His handlers have prevented him from appearing before the various committees looking into the accusations. At this point, Rodchenkov could be more valuable dead than alive. His death would be a powerful weapon to disrupt the normalization of relations with Russia.
Former head of Russian anti-doping laboratory and key “witness” of the “Russian doping program” Gregory Rodchenkov then and now.
In conclusion, going back to the Pyeongchang Olympics, there should be caution before assuming the guilt of the Russian athletes who received ADRVs. It makes no sense that two Russian athletes would take useless medications knowing they will be tested and found out.
The doping incident serves the interests of those in the West who seek more not less conflict and seek to weaken Russia through “hybrid” warfare.
It is possible the CIA has a hand in the latest incidents, just as they have a hand in Dr.Gregory Rodchenkov. They have the means, opportunity and motive. They have the experience and history.
If this is true, it’s another example of the dangerous descent in international relations. The Olympics movement has the goal of fostering peaceful relations. The sad truth is there are forces who want to prevent that. They prefer to demonize and divide in a quest for economic and geopolitical supremacy over “adversaries”. International sports is just another arena for them.
- New Mexico Is The US State With The Highest Rate Of Burglary
The long and freezing winter nights are finally starting to let up in most parts of the United States. Many people will probably feel the threat from burglary will be reduced in line with the longer evenings. In actual fact, as Statista’s Niall McCarthy notes, break-ins are more of a summer phenomenon in the U.S., becoming more common when the evenings get brighter.
They actually spike ten percent in June, July and August. One of the theories behind the trend is that people let their guard down and become complacent as the weather gets warmer. Even though it’s true that some burglars use the winter nights as cover, it is far more likely that people are at home during cold weather while during the summer, they tend to go out for longer.
According to the FBI, 60 percent of burglaries happen between 6am and 6pm. In 2016, there were 278,600 break-ins at night and 486,006 during the day with an average of $2,361 stolen. With spring on the horizon, which parts of the U.S. are experiencing the biggest threat from burglars?
You will find more infographics at Statista
The most recent FBI data shows that the South-Central states suffer the worst impact with New Mexico experiencing the highest rate.
In 2016, it had 840.4 instances per 100,000 residents and experts aren’t too surprised about that considering how much of the Mexican drug trade flows through the state, particularly Albuquerque.
Arkansas comes second with 795.5 burglaries per 100,000 inhabitants while Mississippi comes third with 781.4.
New York has the lowest burglary rate in the U.S. with just 201.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2016.
- Growing Risk Of US-Iran Hostilities Based On False Pretexts, Intel Vets Warn
As President Donald Trump prepares to host Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu next week, a group of U.S. intelligence veterans offers corrections to a number of false accusations that have been levelled against Iran.
* * *
February 26, 2018
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS)
SUBJECT: War With Iran
INTRODUCTION
In our December 21st Memorandum to you, we cautioned that the claim that Iran is currently the world’s top sponsor of terrorism is unsupported by hard evidence. Meanwhile, other false accusations against Iran have intensified. Thus, we feel obliged to alert you to the virtually inevitable consequences of war with Iran, just as we warned President George W. Bush six weeks before the U.S. attack on Iraq 15 years ago.
In our first Memorandum in this genre we told then-President Bush that we saw “no compelling reason” to attack Iraq, and warned “the unintended consequences are likely to be catastrophic.” The consequences will be far worse, should the U.S. become drawn into war with Iran. We fear that you are not getting the straight story on this from your intelligence and national security officials.
After choosing “War With Iran” for the subject-line of this Memo, we were reminded that we had used it before, namely, for a Memorandum to President Obama on August 3, 2010 in similar circumstances. You may wish to ask your staff to give you that one to read and ponder. It included a startling quote from then-Chairman of President Bush Jr.’s Intelligence Advisory Board (and former national security adviser to Bush Sr.) Gen. Brent Scowcroft, who told the Financial Times on October 14, 2004 that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had George W. Bush “mesmerized;” that “Sharon just has him wrapped around his little finger.” We wanted to remind you of that history, as you prepare to host Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu next week.
* * *
Rhetoric vs. Reality
We believe that the recent reporting regarding possible conflict with nuclear-armed North Korea has somewhat obscured consideration of the significantly higher probability that Israel or even Saudi Arabia will take steps that will lead to a war with Iran that will inevitably draw the United States in. Israel is particularly inclined to move aggressively, with potentially serious consequences for the U.S., in the wake of the recent incident involving an alleged Iranian drone and the shooting down of an Israeli aircraft.
There is also considerable anti-Iran rhetoric in U.S. media, which might well facilitate a transition from a cold war-type situation to a hot war involving U.S. forces. We have for some time been observing with some concern the growing hostility towards Iran coming out of Washington and from the governments of Israel and Saudi Arabia. National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster is warning that the “time to act is now” to thwart Iran’s aggressive regional ambitions while U.S. United Nations Ambassador Nikki Haley sees a “wake-up” call in the recent shooting incident involving Syria and Israel. Particular concern has been expressed by the White House that Iran is exploiting Shi’a minorities in neighboring Sunni dominated states to create unrest and is also expanding its role in neighboring Iraq and Syria.
While we share concerns over the Iranian government’s intentions vis-à-vis its neighbors, we do not believe that the developments in the region, many of which came about through American missteps, have a major impact on vital U.S. national interests. Nor is Iran, which often sees itself as acting defensively against surrounding Sunni states, anything like an existential threat to the United States that would mandate the sustained military action that would inevitably result if Iran is attacked.
Iran’s alleged desire to stitch together a sphere of influence consisting of an arc of allied nations and proxy forces running from its western borders to the Mediterranean Sea has been frequently cited as justification for a more assertive policy against Tehran, but we believe this concern to be greatly exaggerated. Iran, with a population of more than 80 million, is, to be sure, a major regional power but militarily, economically and politically it is highly vulnerable.
Limited Military Capability
Tehran’s Revolutionary Guard is well armed and trained, but much of its “boots on the ground” army consists of militiamen of variable quality. Its Air Force is a “shadow” of what existed under the Shah and is significantly outgunned by its rivals in the Persian Gulf, not to mention Israel. Its navy is only “green water” capable in that it consists largely of smaller vessels responsible for coastal defense supplemented by the swarming of Revolutionary Guard small speedboats.
When Napoleon had conquered much of continental Europe and was contemplating invading Britain it was widely believed that England was helpless before him. British Admiral Earl St Vincent was unperturbed: “I do not say the French can’t come, I only say they can’t come by sea.” We likewise believe that Iran’s apparent threat is in reality decisively limited by its inability to project power across the water or through the air against neighboring states that have marked superiority in both respects.
The concern over a possibly developing “Shi’ite land bridge,” also referred to as an “arc” or “crescent,” is likewise overstated. It ignores the reality that Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon all have strong national identities and religiously mixed populations. They are influenced — some of them strongly — by Iran but they are not puppet states. And there is also an ethnic division that the neighboring states’ populations are very conscious of– they are Arabs and Iran is Persian, which is also true of the Shi’a populations in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates.
Majority Shi’a Iraq, for example, is now very friendly to Iran but it has to deal with considerable Kurdish and Sunni minorities in its governance and in the direction of its foreign policy. It will not do Iran’s bidding on a number of key issues, including Baghdad’s relationship with Washington, and would be unwilling to become a proxy in Tehran’s conflicts with Israel and Saudi Arabia. Iraqi Vice President Osama al-Nujaifi, the highest-ranking Sunni in the Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi government, has, for example, recently called for the demobilization of the Shi’ite Popular Mobilization Forces or militias that have been fighting ISIS because they “have their own political aspirations, their own [political] agendas. … They are very dangerous to the future of Iraq.”
Nuclear Weapons Thwarted
A major concern that has undergirded much of the perception of an Iranian threat is the possibility that Tehran will develop a nuclear weapon somewhere down the road. We believe that the current Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, even if imperfect, provides the best response to that Iranian proliferation problem. The U.N. inspections regime is strict and, if the agreement stands, there is every reason to believe that Iran will be unable to take the necessary precursor steps leading to a nuclear weapons program. Iran will be further limited in its options after the agreement expires in nine years. Experts believe that, at that point, Iran its not likely to choose to accumulate the necessary highly enriched uranium stocks to proceed.
The recent incident involving the shoot-down of a drone alleged to be Iranian, followed by the downing of an Israeli fighter by a Syrian air defense missile, resulted in a sharp response from Tel Aviv, though reportedly mitigated by a warning from Russian President Vladimir Putin that anything more provocative might inadvertently involve Russia in the conflict. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is said to have moderated his response but his government is clearly contemplating a more robust intervention to counter what he describes as a developing Iranian presence in Syria.
In addition, Netanyahu may be indicted on corruption charges, and it is conceivable that he might welcome a “small war” to deflect attention from mounting political problems at home.
Getting Snookered Into War
We believe that the mounting Iran hysteria evident in the U.S. media and reflected in Beltway groupthink has largely been generated by Saudi Arabia and Israel, who nurture their own aspirations for regional political and military supremacy. There are no actual American vital interests at stake and it is past time to pause and take a step backwards to consider what those interests actually are in a region that has seen nothing but disaster since 2003. Countering an assumed Iranian threat that is minimal and triggering a war would be catastrophic and would exacerbate instability, likely leading to a breakdown in the current political alignment of the entire Middle East. It would be costly for the United States.
Iran is not militarily formidable, but its ability to fight on the defensive against U.S. naval and air forces is considerable and can cause high casualties. There appears to be a perception in the Defense Department that Iran could be defeated in a matter of days, but we would warn that such predictions tend to be based on overly optimistic projections, witness the outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Tehran would be able again to unleash terrorist resources throughout the region, endangering U.S. military and diplomats based there as well as American travelers and businesses. The terrorist threat might easily extend beyond the Middle East into Europe and also the United States, while the dollar costs of a major new conflict and its aftermath could break the bank, literally.
Another major consideration before ratcheting up hostilities should be that a war with Iran might not be containable. As the warning from President Vladimir Putin to Netanyahu made clear, other major powers have interests in what goes on in the Persian Gulf, and there is a real danger that a regional war could have global consequences.
In sum, we see a growing risk that the U.S. will become drawn into hostilities on pretexts fabricated by Israel and Saudi Arabia for their actual common objective (“regime change” in Iran). A confluence of factors and misconceptions about what is at stake and how such a conflict is likely to develop, coming from both inside and outside the Administration have, unfortunately, made such an outcome increasingly likely.
We have seen this picture before, just 15 years ago in Iraq, which should serve as a warning. The prevailing perception of threat that the Mullahs of Iran allegedly pose directly against the security of the U.S. is largely contrived. Even if all the allegations were true, they would not justify an Iraq-style “preventive war” violating national as well as international law. An ill-considered U.S. intervention in Iran is surely not worth the horrific humanitarian, military, economic, and political cost to be paid if Washington allows itself to become part of an armed attack.
FOR THE STEERING GROUP, VETERAN INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS FOR SANITY
William Binney, former NSA Technical Director for World Geopolitical & Military Analysis; Co-founder of NSA’s Signals Intelligence Automation Research Center (ret.)
Kathleen Christison, CIA, Senior Analyst on Middle East (ret.)
Graham E. Fuller, Vice-Chair, National Intelligence Council (ret.)
Philip Giraldi, CIA, Operations Officer (ret.)
Matthew Hoh, former Capt., USMC Iraq; Foreign Service Officer, Afghanistan (associate VIPS)
Larry C. Johnson, former CIA and State Department Counter Terrorism officer
Michael S. Kearns, Captain, USAF; ex-Master SERE Instructor for Strategic Reconnaissance Operations (NSA/DIA) and Special Mission Units (JSOC) (ret.)
John Brady Kiesling, Foreign Service Officer; resigned Feb. 27, 2003 as Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Athens, in protest against the U.S. attack on Iraq (ret.)
John Kiriakou, Former CIA Counterterrorism Officer and former senior investigator, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Edward Loomis, Jr., former NSA Technical Director for the Office of Signals Processing (ret.)
David MacMichael, National Intelligence Council, National Intelligence Estimates Officer (ret.)
Ray McGovern, former US Army infantry/intelligence officer & CIA analyst; CIA Presidential briefer (ret.)
Elizabeth Murray, Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Near East (ret.)
Todd E. Pierce, MAJ, US Army Judge Advocate (ret.)
Coleen Rowley, FBI Special Agent and former Minneapolis Division Legal Counsel (ret.)
Greg Thielmann, former Director of the Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Affairs Office, State Department Bureau of Intelligence & Research (INR), and former senior staffer on Senate Intelligence Committee (ret.)
Kirk Wiebe, former Senior Analyst, SIGINT Automation Research Center, NSA ret.)
Lawrence Wilkerson, Colonel (USA, ret.), former Chief of Staff for Secretary of State; Distinguished Visiting Professor, College of William and Mary (associate VIPS)
Sarah G. Wilton, CDR, USNR, (ret.); Defense Intelligence Agency (ret.)
Robert Wing, former Foreign Service Officer (associate VIPS)
Ann Wright, Colonel, US Army (ret.); also Foreign Service Officer who, like Political Counselor John Brady Kiesling, resigned in opposition to the war on Iraq
- Mnuchin's Wrong: Here's Why Investors Should Be Very Worried About Inflation
Despite Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin’s bizarre insistence that there’s no connection between consumer-price inflation and rising energy prices and wages, these factors – plus a spate of others – are forcing some food companies to consider raising prices on goods from chicken to cereal, according to Reuters.
One of these factors, as Reuters explores in a wide-ranging feature published on Monday, involves US trucking and railroad operators foisting higher shipping rates on customers like General Mills Inc. and Hormel Foods Corp.
According to Reuters, transportation costs are climbing at double the rate of inflation.
These increases are catching food companies off guard. Struggling railroads and trucking companies haven’t expanded their capacity, choosing instead to focus on cost cuts – much to Wall Street’s delight.
Interviews with executives at 10 companies across the food, consumer goods and commodities sectors reveal that many are grappling with how to defend their profit margins as transportation costs climb at nearly double the inflation rate.
Two executives told Reuters their companies do plan to raise prices, though they would not divulge by how much. A third said it was discussing prospective price increases with retailers.
The prospect of higher prices on chicken, cereal and snacks costs comes as inflation emerged as a more distinct threat in recent weeks. The U.S. Labor Department reported earlier this month that underlying consumer prices in January posted their biggest gain in more than a year.
As US economic growth has revved up, railroads and truck fleets have not expanded capacity to keep pace – a decision applauded by Wall Street. Shares of CSX Corp, Norfolk Southern, and Union Pacific Corp have risen an average 22 percent over the past year as they cut headcount, locomotives and rail cars, and lengthened trains to lower expenses and raise margins.
Quickening economic growth, a shortage of drivers and reduced capacity, and higher fuel prices have driven up transportation costs, prompting some companies to threaten to raise prices on goods ranging from chicken to cereal.
So far, Reuters has confirmed that Cream of Wheat maker B&G Foods Inc, Cheerios maker General Mills and Tyson Foods Inc, owner of Hillshire Farms brand and Jimmy Dean sausage, are planning to pass along higher freight costs to their customers. Many see these increases taking place during the coming months.
Tyson Chief Executive Officer Tom Hayes told Reuters in an interview that its price increases ”should be in place for the second half” of its fiscal year, and that it has begun negotiating price increases with retailers and food service operators. The company declined to specify how much its freight costs increased in recent months, but a spokesman said they are up between 10 to 15 percent for the total industry.
General Mills informed convenience store and food service customers of the price increases directly, a spokeswoman told Reuters in an emailed statement, declining to provide specifics. Chief Executive Officer Jeff Harmening cited logistic costs and wage inflation as factors.
“It feels to me like an environment that should be beneficial for some pricing,” he said in a presentation at last week’s Consumer Analyst Group of New York conference.
Hormel Foods, the maker of Skippy peanut butter and SPAM, has been talking with retailers about raising prices, according to Chief Executive Jim Snee.
“We don’t believe we’re going to recoup all of our freight cost increases for the balance of the year,” Snee told Reuters in an interview, noting operating margin sank to 13.2 percent, from 15.6 percent due to higher costs – including freight – in the most recent quarter.
Of all the factors contributing to these cost increases, the paucity of qualified truck drivers is also leading to production disruptions and delays at some of the country’s largest food-processing plants.
Confectionary and snack company Mondelez International Inc halted operations over a weekend late last month at its Toledo, Ohio wheat flour mill – the second-largest flour mill in the United States – because the plant could not get enough rail cars to carry flour to bakeries, a spokeswoman said.
She declined to comment on whether Mondelez would raise prices to cover any higher costs.
A new government regulation for drivers and truck availability are pushing up freight costs at JM Smucker Co. “We anticipate inflationary pressures likely to cause upward price movements in a variety of categories,” Chief Financial Officer Mark Belgya said last week at an analyst conference.
To be sure, transportation costs are just a sliver of the price consumers pay at the grocery store. The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates transportation represents just 3.3 cents of every dollar consumers spend.
But an increase in truck rates over the next 12 months implies a 15-to-18 basis point gross margin headwind for U.S. food companies on average, according to Bernstein analyst Alexia Howard.
“A lot of the consumer goods companies work on margin,” said Joe Glauber, a former USDA Chief Economist and a senior research fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute. “They are going to be pushing those costs along” to retailers. Ultimately “consumers end up shouldering more of the burden,” he said.
That would be a change for consumers who have seen years of low-to-negative food inflation, he noted.
While prices for most agricultural commodities remain near cycle lows, rising oil prices are contributing both to higher transportation costs while also raising the price of plastics used in packaging.
This trend has forced many food brands and commodity producers to lower their full-year earnings forecasts.
Some are blaming CSX and Norfolk Southern for unfairly trying to squeeze “every last dollar” of profit out of their customers.
Global energy prices have risen sharply from 2016’s lows, driving up prices for not only diesel but also packing material like plastics, which are byproducts of crude and natural gas.
Others companies have blamed freight hikes for lower earnings forecasts for 2018, including US oilfield services company Halliburton Co. It shaved ten cents per share from its earnings forecast last week due to delays in deliveries of sand used in fracking.
“They try to squeeze every dollar for profit rather than provide service,” said Robert Murray, the chief executive of Murray Energy Corporation, the largest privately-owned U.S. coal company which relies on CSX and Norfolk Southern to help transport its goods.
Murray said both CSX and Norfolk Southern have lacked rail cars and crew to haul 4 million tons of coal from mines in West Virginia and Ohio to the Port of Baltimore this year.
Despite worsening train speeds, Norfolk Southern has no plans to hire more employees or move some of its equipment out of storage. However, Union Pacific plans to rehire 500 employees in the first quarter to prevent rail cards from idling too long.
Earhart said the railroad was moving some employees to problem spots, like its terminal in Birmingham, Alabama, from other areas of its network.
Union Pacific has started pulling stored locomotives back into service and plans to bring back 600 employees in the first quarter 2018 to prevent rail cars from spending too much time in yards, said Union Pacific spokeswoman Raquel Espinoza.
The time UP rail cars were sitting idle in terminals rose to 32.5 hours in the fourth quarter from 29 hours in the year-ago period, and its overall workforce dropped during the last two quarters, according to company data.
Berkshire Hathaway’s BNSF said winter weather has impacted velocity and fluidity on portions of its primary route between the Pacific Northwest and Midwest, but said it has not been cutting crews and rolling stock.
Another factor that’s prevented trucking companies from expanding is a federal regulation that requires drivers to electronically log their hours. This, Reuters said, has turned off many drivers, who aren’t willing to drive – and shoulder these extra responsibilities – for the wages being offered.
This would suggest that many trucking firms will soon be forced to raise wages – another cost that will likely be passed along to customers.
And because of the tightening capacity, trucking firms have additional leverage as they negotiate rates.
Tight capacity means trucking firms have leverage as they negotiate freight rates. Dry van shipping rates are expected to rise as much as 10 percent in 2018, while “spot” rates for last-minute cargo hit record levels in January before falling slightly, according to online freight marketplace DAT Solutions.
Chemical maker Chemours Company estimates 30 percent of its rail shipments have highly unpredictable delivery times, while automaker Toyota Motor Corp has struggled periodically to get rail cars for finished vehicles at plants served by the major railroads.
“If I was to ask for anything, it’s consistency,” said Lee Hobgood, general manager of Toyota’s transportation operations. “I am not feeling cuts. I am feeling imbalance at times.”
Agribusiness giant Cargill declined to quantify how much its freight costs are going up and whether it would pass costs on to its customers. But at a soybean processing plant near Lafayette, Ind., Cargill has had such long delays getting loaded railcars moved out, the company plans to buy its own Trackmobile railcar mover to relieve the congestion. One Trackmobile unit can cost at least $250,000.
Brad Hildebrand, Cargill’s Global Rail and Barge Lead, told Reuters the Lafayette plant otherwise could shut down.
“When we load a train at one of our eastern elevators it sits for an extended period of time before locomotive power and crews can come in,” Hildebrand said. “There is no slack in the system to handle weather problems or even a small uptick in demand.”
Increasingly inconsistent delivery times are a huge problem for companies hoping to sell their goods at Wal-Mart, the country’s largest brick-and-mortar retailer is punishing trucking companies by charging them additional fees.
In summary, higher energy prices and dwindling workforces are pushing up costs for shipping companies. These costs are, in turn, being passed along to their clients – the big food processors and commodity producers.
How much longer will it be before these companies turn around and hike prices on the consumer?
- Career Advice To 20-Somethings: Create Value As A Mobile Creative
Authored by Charles Hugh Smith via OfTwoMinds blog,
Finding work that fits who you are is rarely easy, especially if you don’t fit into the mainstream, and usually it requires a lot of compromises, hard work and dead-ends. But that’s the process.
Establishing a satisfying career is difficult in today’s economy, doubly so for those who find life within hierarchical institutions (corporate America and government) unrewarding, and triply so for those burdened with student loan debt and college educations/diplomas of uncertain market value or those re-entering the job market with skills that have been marginalized.
Given that I wrote a book entitled Get a Job, Build a Real Career, and Defy a Bewildering Economy, it’s unsurprising that I get emails from young people asking for career advice.
I’ve also written essays of friendly advice such as A Teachable Moment: to the Young Person Who Complained About Her Job/Pay at Yelp and Was Promptly Fired.
Here is my response to a recent email from a 20-something in a familiar place: burdened with student loan debt, aware that the self-serving institutional shuck-and-jive is false (get a college degree and your future is secure), and uncertain how to proceed.
Here is my correspondent’s email:
I wish my faith in our conventional institutions had faded sooner, but I borrowed a lot of money in my early 20s only to find out that most of what I was learning was utterly useless.
But I can’t go back. Only forward. So with thousands of dollars in debt aside, and limited experience in the professional world (food service, retail, and industrial construction), where in the hell can I start? I get a lot of the concepts you are proposing. I get the need to create value for people. I’ve just never really seen it done in a “professional” environment. I’ve scrubbed floors, calibrated thermometers, bent tubing and made coffee. But intellectually this is obviously not satisfying.
I want to create value, I want to solve problems. Not just for altruistic reasons, but because it is the only thing that seems challenging.
So what would you tell a late 20 something, who’s not used to wearing a suit and tie, starting from the bottom, with the intellectual capacity to do more than scrub floors? Because I guarantee you… there are plenty of us waiting in the shadows to exercise our inalienable human right to achievement, collaboration, and freedom.
A lot of us just resent the monstrosity that centralized thinking has created. But we need to put that bitterness aside and come out of the shadows to contribute.
Extremely well said. Here is my response:
You’re right–there’s often very little value created in “professional” environments, which is partly why so many people are dissatisfied/frustrated with their jobs/ work life.
My book Get a Job, Build a Real Career has some suggestions, which I will summarize here.
1. Lower your cost basis (cost of living) so you can live a satisfying life while earning comparatively little money. This starts with the usual drill: cook all your own food, waste nothing, etc. The first bit of advice a successful artist tells people is “get accustomed to poverty.” But low income doesn’t have to mean unhappiness/destitution.
Focus on the highest expenses where you have the most leverage, which is often housing. How can you create value? Lots of small apartment owners can’t find anyone responsible to maintain their building, so becoming that person could drop your rent a lot. Another possibility is rent a house and then rent rooms to responsible people at rates that lower your share of the rent to very low rates. You’re in charge, you keep the place tidy, you select nice, responsible people to share the house and that’s why people will pay to rent rooms in your house. You’re creating value by taking care of all the stuff most people won’t do or can’t do.
2. Find ways to get satisfaction/meaning /purpose in life regardless of the income generated. This could be a community garden, volunteering at a church or school, or pursuing some project of your own that doesn’t rely on others’ approval or money for its success. If “work” isn’t satisfying, at least you have multiple sources of satisfaction/purpose outside of work.
3. As for work, the cliché is, find an endeavor that you would do for fun or after hours regardless of the pay. This “work” will align with your character, aptitudes, interests, strengths and subconscious/unconscious drives. As Carl Jung observed, “Until you make the unconscious conscious, it will direct your life and you will call it fate.”
And as Jerry Garcia said, “You do not merely want to be considered just the best of the best. You want to be considered the only one who does what you do.”
Finding work that fits who you are is rarely easy, especially if you don’t fit into the mainstream, and usually it requires a lot of compromises, hard work and dead-ends. But that’s the process.
4. Trust your network. I’m not good at networking, far from it, but the more people who know you’re a responsible hard-working person who will do what you say you’ll do, and the more people who know your interests, the greater the chances that somebody will offer you some apparently tiny opportunity that might turn into something larger with time.
5. As Drew Sample points out in our recent podcast, sometimes the best way to create value is to work on ourselves, i.e. develop the eight soft skills I list in my book that are applicable to every field of endeavor and are thus always in demand. They require dedication, self-awareness, humility and hard work to acquire. They create value in every field because all fields are now collaborative, networked, global and fast-changing.
6. Set a goal of creating multiple income streams/ways of creating value for others. In terms of living an anti-fragile, fulfilling and relatively resilient life, the ideal arrangement is multiple income streams/value creation in disparate (unrelated) fields, so if one field of endeavor is disrupted then others will still continue since they’re not connected to the sector that’s been overturned by technological innovation, globalization, etc.
This is what I call the Mobile Creative class–not necessarily mobile in terms of physical movement between locales but mobile between sectors and ways of generating value.
The New Class: Mobile Creatives (May 1, 2014)
The Mobile Creative credo: trust the network, not the corporation or the state.The Changing World of Work 3: “Full-Stack” Skills (April 15, 2015)
To be honest, I’ve struggled for decades to reach this understanding. I didn’t have any mentors, so I had to mentor myself, which given my lack of experience, was difficult. Sometimes we have to mentor ourselves from the perspective that we’re going to become successful at being ourselves and adding value, regardless of our income. As our own mentor, we seek to advise and encourage ourselves just as we would advise and encourage a close friend.
This advice is not age-specific. The Mobile Creative approach to creating value applies equally to people in their 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s and yes 70s.
Drew and I discuss the process of creating value from the perspective of those working outside “professional” institutional environments: The Sample Hour 184: Creating Value.
* * *My new book Money and Work Unchained is $9.95 for the Kindle ebook and $20 for the print edition. Read the first section for free in PDF format. If you found value in this content, please join me in seeking solutions by becoming a $1/month patron of my work via patreon.com.
- Michael Wolff Busted Faking Earpiece Malfunction During Question About Trump Affair
Weeks after author Michael Wolff was kicked off of MSNBC’s Morning Joe for deflecting questions about a claim over an alleged extramarital affair in his anti-Trump book Fire and Fury, the wacky author faked an earpiece malfunction on Australian television when asked about the exact same claim.
Wolff wrote a book full of salacious claims about the Trump White House after former advisor Steve Bannon reportedly let him in
“You said during a TV interview last month that you are absolutely sure that Donald Trump is currently having an affair, while President, behind the back of the First Lady. I repeat, you said you were absolutely sure,” asked host Ben Fordham on Today.
Despite having zero technical issues prior to that question, Wolff begins to insist that he can’t hear the host – fiddling with his earpiece.
FORDHAM: “You said during a TV interview last month that you are absolutely sure that Donald Trump is currently having an affair, while President, behind the back of the First Lady. I repeat, you said you were absolutely sure.”
WOLFF: “Hold on, I can’t–”
FORDHAM: “Last week, you backflipped and said, ‘I do not know if the President is having an affair.’ Do you owe the President and the First Lady an apology, Mr Wolff?”
WOLFF: “I can’t hear you. Hello?”
FORDHAM: “Just last month you said you were absolutely sure that the President was having an affair, and now you say he is not.”
WOLFF: “I’m not getting anything.”
FORDHAM: “You are not hearing me, Mr. Wolff? Mr. Wolff was hearing me before, but he’s not hearing me anymore. So the interview may be over.”
Hello ? You there, Mr Wolff ? Author blames technical issues when I ask him if he owes an apology to @realDonaldTrump and @FLOTUS pic.twitter.com/Ihyon5q370
— BenFordham (@BenFordham) February 25, 2018
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Following Wolff’s “technical difficulties,” Fordham released the audio of what Wolff was hearing in his earpiece when he appears to fake the malfunction:
LISTEN – This is what Michael Wolff was HEARING in his earpiece when he claimed he couldn’t hear my question on @TheTodayShow this morning. pic.twitter.com/dl3ZvQfKWm
— BenFordham (@BenFordham) February 26, 2018
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On February 1st, MSNBC’s resident Trump-hating host, Mika Brzezinski, kicked Wolff off the air after he denied suggesting Trump was having an affair with U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley.
Michael Wolff is such a fraud he is kicked off Morning Joe mid segment. 😂
And the “This is Morning Joe, we don’t BS here” is the icing on the cake.
Liberals are a mess. pic.twitter.com/bP7Cl7giBM
— Nobel Patriot 🇺🇸 (@nobelpatriot) February 1, 2018
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Wolff all but confirmed the rumor from his book in a January interview with Bill Maher. Via Vanity Fair:
During an appearance on Real Time with Bill Maher Friday, Wolff said that he’s “absolutely sure” Donald Trump is currently having an extramarital affair with someone inside the White House.
When Maher asked Wolff to tell him “something that the other people have not noticed in this book,” Wolff said, “There is something in the book that I was absolutely sure of, but it was so incendiary that I just didn’t have the ultimate proof.” He then elaborated: “Well, I didn’t have the blue dress.”
Maher asked if Wolff was talking about somebody Trump is “f—ing now,” and Wolff nodded. “It is,” he said. “You just have to read between the lines. It’s toward the end of the book. . .You’ll know it. Now that I’ve told you, when you hit that paragraph, you’re gonna say, ‘Bingo.’”
Between the FBI using the Clinton-funded “pissgate” dossier to spy on Carter Page and Wolff’s salacious claims that he now refuses to substantiate on live TV, it seems that the all-out assault on President Trump is, like Hillary Clinton’s campaign, becoming a complete failure.
When Michael Wolff’s earpiece works fine but he doesn’t want to answer the question: pic.twitter.com/GcvJN33suW
— jeremy scahill (@jeremyscahill) February 26, 2018
- Are You A Russian Troll?
Authored by A Burton Hinkle via Reason.com,
The federal indictments special counsel Robert Mueller handed down a few days ago confirmed that Russian agents did, indeed, use social media to interfere with the 2016 presidential election – and, even more than that, to sow political animosity, heighten divisions, and pit Americans against one another. Several workers at a Russian “troll farm” have now confirmed the thrust of the indictment.
As Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein said when the indictments were announced, “the Russian conspirators want to promote discord in the United States and undermine public confidence in democracy. We must not allow them to succeed.”
Absolutely right. But how to stop them?
Lyudmilla Savchuk – a worker at the troll farm – has explained how Russian agents take pains to hide their true identity: “The most important principle of the work is to have an account like a real person. They create real characters, choosing a gender, a name, a place of living and an occupation. Therefore, it’s hard to tell that the account was made for the propaganda.”
That ability to blend in with online communities raises several troubling questions, the most disturbing of which might be: What if YOU are a Russian troll who sows animosity, heightens division, and pits Americans against one another—and you don’t even know it?
The following quiz has been developed to help answer that very question. Let’s play!
(1) When you see a post online that supports your political tribe, you
(a) treat it skeptically until its assertions can be independently confirmed;
(b) nod sagely and move on;
(c) pause to enjoy the sweet, sweet dopamine hit that comes from having your existing beliefs confirmed; or
(d) immediately share it with everybody you can think of.
(2) When you read something that makes you mad, you
(a) pause to consider the possibility that the author is right and you are wrong;
(b) forget it and move on;
(c) stop reading immediately to avoid being exposed to ideas you dislike; or
(d) leave a comment pointing out that the author is a despicable excuse for a human being who should die a slow and wretched death.
(3) Terms such as “libtard” and “rethuglican” are
(a) demeaning insults that inhibit the open exchange of ideas and prevent learning from others;
(b) kind of juvenile;
(c) pretty witty, actually;
(d) literally true.
(4) An article about a person of the opposing political tribe who has said or done something really stupid and embarrassing is
(a) nothing but partisan clickbait;
(b) not surprising;
(c) further proof that all members of the opposing tribe are stupid;
(d) going up on your social-media account in 3… 2….
(5) A politician of your own political tribe has just done something really stupid and embarrassing. You
(a) find this dismaying, and say so;
(b) explain why it’s not so bad;
(c) attack the opposing tribe for being jerks and making a big fat deal out of it;
(d) point out that it’s not half as bad as all the stupid, embarrassing things members of the opposing tribe have done.
(5) As a member in good standing of your political tribe, you have always believed X. The leader of your political tribe has just come out against X. You
(a) call him or her to account for abandoning your tribe’s principles;
(b) try not to notice;
(c) change your mind about X;
(d) change your mind about X and attempt to excommunicate any member of your political tribe who still has the audacity to think X is even defensible.
(6) People who disagree with you deserve
(a) an honest hearing;
(b) pity;
(c) scorn;
(d) to burn in hell for all eternity.
(7) Online memes are
(a) superficial and usually inaccurate characterizations of the opposing tribe’s views;
(b) occasionally sharp critiques of the tensions inherent in any belief system;
(c) hilarious;
(d) stupid if they’re about your side and brilliant if they’re about the other side.
* * *
SCORING:
Give yourself one point for each (a), two points for each (b), three points for each (c), and four points for each (d).
7-10 points: America. Love it or leave it.
11-15 points: Both sides were equally to blame for the Cold War.
16-20: Hey, who doesn’t get goosebumps listening to the Song of the Volga Boatmen?
21+: You live under a bridge and eat Vladimir Putin’s table scraps.
- CDC Official Who Handled Zika, Ebola Outbreaks Mysteriously Disappears Without A Trace
A Harvard-trained CDC official has been missing since February 12 after leaving work midway through the day due to an illness, prompting his friends and family to sound the alarm and issue a $10,000 reward for information leading to an arrest and indictment in the event of malfeasance.
Terrell Cunningham, 60, said his son’s supervisor told him that Commander Cunningham had reported for work but that he had left midday because he wasn’t feeling well. –NYT
The family of Timothy J. Cunningham, 35, grew concerned after the Harvard-trained epidemiologist and US Navy officer wouldn’t answer texts or calls. Driving over 600 miles from Maryland to Atlanta, Cunningham’s parents gained access to his house where they found their son’s phone, wallet and driver’s license.
Quoted by the NYT, his father said that Commander Cunningham had “a lot going on” personally and professionally, and his most recent conversation with his son had left him worried.
“The tone, and the numerous exchanges gave us reason to be concerned about Tim,” Terrell Cunningham said. “And I don’t know if it’s an instinct you have because it’s your child, but it was not a normal conversation and I was not comfortable.”
Cunningham’s car was parked in the garage, while his dog – Mr. Bojangles, aka Bo, was left all by himself.
“Tim never leaves Bo unattended,” Terrell Cunningham told NBC News. “He just doesn’t do it.”
“None of this makes sense,” Timothy’s brother Anterio told Atlanta Fox affiliate WAGA-TV. “He wouldn’t just evaporate like this and leave his dog alone and have our mother wondering and worrying like this. He wouldn’t.”
“I feel like I’m in a horrible Black Mirror episode,” Cunningham’s sister Tiara told the New York Times. “I’m kind of lost without him, to be quite honest.”
Tiara was the last family member to speak with Timothy Cunningham before his disappearance – who said the last time they spoke her brother “sounded not like himself.” When she texted him a bit later, she didn’t get a response – nor did the rest of the Cunningham family.
Police investigating the disappearance have not turned up any leads, however they have found no evidence of foul play. “As of today we have been unable to locate Mr. Cunningham and we are seeking the assistance of the public with this case,” Officer Donald T. Hannah of the Atlanta Police Department said in an email to The Times on Saturday.
Cunningham – who was promoted to commander in the US Public Health Service last July, had worked on the government’s response to both Zika and Ebola outbreaks. With two degrees from Harvard’s School of Public Health, he had been named one of The Atlanta Business Chronicle’s “40 under 40” award winners.
- Averting The US-Russia Warpath
For nearly twenty years following the end of the Cold War, military confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation seemed implausible. Even during periods of tension, as during the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s, few believed that disagreement between Washington and Moscow could lead to a serious crisis, no less war. Before the first decade of the new century had passed, however, Russian officials were accusing the United States of working to isolate Russia. Such apprehensions have mounted steadily in Russia in the years since.
At the same time, Russian behavior, including interventions in Ukraine and Syria, military posturing and harassment in Europe, and interference in Western elections, has led many in the United States to conclude that, while a U.S.-Russian conflict is by no means inevitable, the risk of such a confrontation is growing.
Even as U.S.-Russian tensions have risen, fundamental shifts in the military-technological environment threaten to erode strategic stability between the two nations. In the coming years, both sides’ extensive dependence on information technology, coupled with likely perceptions of lower risk for the use of “nonkinetic” and nonlethal attacks, are creating new incentives to use cyber and/or counterspace weapons early in a crisis or conflict. At the same time, the advent of novel cyber, counterspace, precision-strike, missile-defense and autonomous military systems could cause one or both nations to lose confidence in their nuclear second-strike capabilities—thereby eroding the stability afforded by mutually assured destruction.
WASHINGTON AND Moscow hold divergent—and, in some cases, directly contradictory—views of the international security environment. Whereas Russian leaders see their country as behaving in a fundamentally defensive manner, the United States and NATO perceive a revanchist actor intent on reimposing its will in eastern Europe and Central Asia.The Russian government rates the United States and NATO as the most serious threats to Russian national security. From its standpoint, the United States is intent on remaining the world’s sole hegemon, and, as such, is unwilling to tolerate a strong Russia that enjoys its own sphere of influence. Moscow has spoken out against American and European efforts to encircle the Russian Federation by integrating former Soviet republics into Western institutions like NATO and the European Union. Russian officials further condemn the United States’ purported use of “color revolutions”—or, as Moscow would characterize them, the sponsorship of coups d’état under a guise of democracy promotion—to install proxies in Russia’s “near abroad.” In addition, Russian analysts assert that the United States and NATO are using a variety of political, economic and informational tools to penetrate and disrupt Russian society itself. In response to these perceived threats, Russia has undertaken a major military modernization effort and used more aggressive rhetoric and military operations, economic coercion and inducements, and information operations to counter alleged U.S. and NATO expansionism.
The view from Washington and Europe differs markedly. In the assessment of the United States and NATO, the Kremlin appears intent on restoring a buffer zone of compliant or client states throughout its self-declared “near abroad.” Western officials condemn Russia’s violations of international law and norms by using force against Ukraine, changing borders in Europe through violence, violating arms-control agreements and seeking to undermine Western democratic elections. They are equally concerned by Russian military modernization, which, coupled with intensified military exercises, activities and bellicose rhetoric, is seen as a direct threat to NATO security. The United States and its allies have responded to perceived Russian aggression by strengthening NATO’s deterrent posture, as well as holding increasingly frank discussions about NATO’s central role in defeating a Russian attack.
U.S.-Russian relations in the coming years will take one of three forms: strategic rapprochement, intensified military competition or managed competition. Although a long-term rapprochement cannot be ruled out, and indeed is a valuable (very) long-term goal, striving for such an outcome—or even another attempted “reset” (or “re-reset”)—in the near term would likely lead to quick disappointment. This reality does not eliminate room for the pursuit of common interests on issues such as nuclear nonproliferation, counterterrorism and counternarcotics. Yet both the United States and Russia must act on the understanding that there is a real potential for political disputes to lead to crisis, and for crisis to lead to conflict.
At the same time, Russia’s nuclear forces will, for the foreseeable future, allow it to destroy the United States as a functioning society. Hence, as distasteful as “working with” Russia may seem, the alternative of full-throated confrontation would pose unacceptable and unnecessary risks to the United States. That said, one should not brim over with unbridled optimism. Russian leaders are engaged in continuing efforts to undermine America’s alliances, democratic processes and global role. A change in this strategic approach appears highly unlikely, and as a result U.S.-Russia competition is the likeliest path short of outright confrontation. The challenge, then, is charting a balanced path ahead that recognizes the real competition and potential for conflict, while allowing for prudent cooperation and improvement in the relationship where possible.
THE UNITED States and Russia are each pursuing a range of advanced military technologies in order to bolster their respective conventional military postures in Europe (and in the western Pacific, in the case of the United States). Priority investments for both sides include novel cyber, counterspace, long-range nonnuclear-strike, missile-defense and autonomous weapons systems. Russian strategists writing in Military Thought, the in-house journal of the Russian General Staff, rightly note that these technologies are likely to significantly increase the pace of military engagements. Uncertainty about these systems’ effects will also increase risk of miscalculation or misunderstanding. These factors, both singularly and in interaction with one another, could lead to “slippery slopes” of rapid escalation from crisis to conflict, especially in cyberspace and outer space.
The U.S. and Russian militaries are increasingly dependent on networked information technology (IT), and both have embarked on ambitious offensive cyber programs. Because of the frailty of cyberweapons—once a weapon is revealed in detail, the adversary can fashion effective defenses—there exists a tremendous premium on secrecy regarding both states’ cyber tool kits. As a result, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds each side’s capabilities. Even so, a 2013 Defense Science Board report conveyed a sense of cyberweapons’ potential impact: “The benefits to an attacker using cyber exploits are potentially spectacular.” Similar dynamics obtain in the space domain. The United States relies heavily on vulnerable military satellites for a host of critical military functions. The Russian Federation does so too, but to a far lesser extent. At the same time, both side possess inherent antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities in their ballistic-missile defense interceptors, and are developing other ASAT weapons, such as co-orbital satellites, missiles, directed-energy weapons and cyberattacks.
Five specific factors could lead to rapid and unintended escalation in cyberspace and outer space.
First, the United States and Russia will likely face strong incentives to use cyber and counterspace attacks early in a future crisis or conflict. These capabilities could offer—or be seen to offer—an opportunity to rapidly degrade an adversary’s information systems at the outset of a conflict, conferring a significant advantage to the first mover. Indeed, Russian strategists have been clear in their assessment that seizing the initiative in the information domain will be key to victory in future wars. In addition, Washington and Moscow may perceive the use of cyber and nonkinetic counterspace weapons as less escalatory than that of kinetic weapons, since they can be employed in nonlethal, non-physically-destructive and reversible ways. This assessment is also reflected in Russian doctrinal writings. Russian strategists characterize both ASAT and cyberweapons as optimal tools for deterrence, since they can be used to destroy enemy infrastructure without inflicting heavy civilian casualties. Such a belief could further lower the threshold for early cyber and counterspace attacks.
Second, cyber and counterspace attacks intended to be highly discriminative against military targets may cascade to affect critical infrastructure essential to a broader society and economy (e.g., electrical grids or commercial satellites). If this occurred, an attack intended to be precise and limited to military targets could instead result in the widespread loss of electrical power, water or other essential services, with resulting economic disruption and potential loss of life. The attacked side could feel compelled to respond at least in kind. Alternatively, a tit-for-tat cycle may occur, as one side might believe it could gain coercive advantage by intentionally demonstrating its ability to pose risks to the other side’s critical infrastructure through a combination of cyber, counterspace and perhaps sabotage attacks. Prominent Russian strategists endorse this view, arguing that attacks on socioeconomic targets can frighten an enemy population into abandoning its war effort against Russia. Yet such countervalue strikes could lead to major conflict and even, in an extreme scenario, nuclear war.
Third, attacks intended to target nonnuclear systems (including but not limited to cyber and space attacks) could inadvertently impinge on nuclear systems, and be misread as a much more escalatory move. For instance, some assets in outer space support both conventional and nuclear missions—particularly in the case of the United States—and both theater and strategic missions. In addition, many terrestrial elements of U.S. command, control and communications, as well as long-range strike systems, are dual-use, and there may be co-location of conventional and nuclear systems by one or both sides. Cyber or counterspace attacks on these systems could therefore implicate nuclear systems, raising the potential for inadvertent escalation.
Fourth, to the extent that the attacker’s initial cyber, space and precision-strike attacks were successful in negating a portion of the other side’s military, the attacked side would fear further debilitating attacks, and could worry that it must use or lose its strategic-level attack capabilities, including not only cyber and space, but also long-range strike capabilities. In the extreme, it may feel its conventional capabilities so weakened that it would consider the use of nuclear weapons. By the same token, nuclear forces use IT and space assets for warning and communications. As a result, a cyber or space attack could put nuclear use-or-lose considerations into play early in a crisis.
Russian strategists are especially cognizant of these dynamics and recognize that a drawn-out conflict will likely force both sides up the escalation ladder. To avoid this outcome, a number of Russian military theorists argue for the use of defensive preemptive strikes—especially using nonnuclear capabilities—on enemy military and/or socioeconomic targets. Some suggest that these strikes could degrade adversary power-projection capabilities, such that Russia could avoid being forced into a situation where it had to use or lose its strategic-level assets in the first place. Others say—as previously mentioned—that tailored preemptive strikes could deter aggression by communicating to target policymakers and publics alike that the costs of attacking or escalating a military confrontation with Russia would outweigh the benefits.
Fifth, inadvertent escalation could result from a mis-attributed attack or third-party false-flag operation. Chance errors in a key system, in the midst of crisis, such as an internal fault in a side’s command-and-control system or one induced by natural causes (e.g., a solar flare or an electrical surge), could be construed by one side to be an intentional act by the other. In addition, the diffusion of offensive cyber capabilities could allow smaller powers or nonstate actors to provoke a conflict—for instance, by conducting a “false flag” digital operation designed to trigger a crisis. Alternatively, once a conflict has begun, they could use their own capabilities to expand the scope or scale of the conflict.
The possibility of escalation to large-scale war stemming, even inadvertently, from lower-order conflicts or tensions has long been appreciated in the context of the United States and Russia. The contention here, however, is that technological advances, their integration into military postures and doctrines on both sides, and the often-unanticipated ways in which such integrations may interact are together heightening the possibility of inadvertent, rapid and dramatic escalation in the event of crisis or conflict between the United States and Russia.
STRATEGIC STABILITY between the United States and Russia has long rested on each side’s confidence that it could absorb even an all-out nuclear first strike by the other side and then unleash a devastating nuclear second strike. That confidence, however, is being tested by the deployment of new military systems.
As these capabilities mature, each side is likely to have growing fears that the other side might employ these capabilities (with or without also using nuclear weapons) in a first strike to attempt to negate its nuclear second-strike capabilities, thereby obviating mutually assured destruction.
Cyber weapons could be used against vulnerable nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and command, control and communications (NC3). The potential vulnerability of these systems, particularly as both countries’ offensive cyber capabilities mature, may exacerbate each side’s fears about the vulnerability of its nuclear deterrent to the other side’s potential preemptive attack. For instance, if a cyberattack on NC3 could delay the other side from giving an order to execute a nuclear strike for even thirty minutes, it could potentially negate the other side’s ability to launch its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) under attack, increasing the risk to such ICBM and narrowing the potential response options for the victim’s leadership. In a future crisis, in which one side believed that the other was able and willing to stage such an attack, it could perceive itself as having extremely little time to make a decision and might employ cyber or other capabilities (e.g. nonnuclear or nuclear weapons) preemptively, or more extensively than otherwise might be the case.
Counterspace attacks also pose serious escalation risks given space systems’ relevance to nuclear operations, especially for the United States. There appears at this time little prospect that either side could substantially impact the other’s second-strike capabilities through counterspace attacks, and unclassified reporting suggests that neither the United States nor Russia has a robust counterspace capability. Moreover, even if it were able to disrupt or destroy key elements of the other side’s space architecture, each side has ground-based radars to support early warning and substantial terrestrial and/or airborne communications to support secure communications. However, as ASAT technologies improve—for instance, with the deployment of space-based interceptors or directed-energy systems—the risk of an adversary using counterspace operations to disable critical NC3 systems, intentionally or otherwise, will grow commensurately.
Long-range nonnuclear weapons could also pose a threat to strategic stability. Neither side has yet deployed conventional-prompt global-strike (CPGS) capabilities—either conventional weapons on long-range ballistic missiles or hypersonic cruise missiles—that could realistically threaten to disarm an opponent’s strategic deterrent or decapitate its NC3. However, nonnuclear precision strike appears likely to become an increasingly severe problem over time, for two reasons. First, there is concern that the launch of a CPGS missile could be mistaken for the launch of a nuclear-tipped missile, leading the side that fears attack to launch nuclear-tipped missiles in response. Second, the United States and Russia could develop and deploy sufficient numbers of highly capable CPGS weapons to imperil the strategic nuclear deterrent of the other side. Many nuclear delivery platforms, such as road- and rail-based ICBM launchers, might readily be destroyed by conventional forces if they could be effectively targeted. Moreover, future CPGS systems, some Russian and other analysts believe, might ultimately be able to destroy even more defended targets, such as hardened ICBM silos. Missile defenses could “mop up” residual second-strike forces, in turn. The counterforce threat posed by a combination of long-range nonnuclear strike and improved missile defenses is a priority concern for Russian (and Chinese) officials.
As with long-range nonnuclear weapons, neither the United States nor Russia has sufficiently capable or extensive missile-defense systems to deny the other side from being able to conduct a devastating nuclear attack, including in a second strike. Three possible future developments in missile defenses could, however, undermine strategic stability. The first is the deployment of large numbers of kinetic-kill or nuclear-tipped interceptors with the sensor capability, burnout velocity and other features required to engage CPGS and SLBM. The second is the deployment of space-based kinetic-kill interceptors. Third is the deployment of directed-energy systems for missile defense, which appear increasingly plausible as advances are made in solid-state lasers. Any of these developments could seriously threaten the viability of a nation’s second-strike capability.
Finally, the advent of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence may allow states to more reliably target adversary SSBNs and mobile ICBMs. Inasmuch as these systems form the backbone of the U.S. and Russia nuclear forces, respectively, such a breakthrough would pose a severe threat to one or both sides’ nuclear deterrents. Ultimately, however, it is very difficult in an unclassified article to assess the plausibility of developments in strategic antisubmarine warfare or the ability to target mobile ICBMs. It is possible that advances in big-data analytics, for example, yield a breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare and/or time-critical targeting of mobile missiles. Even in this case, however, it is one thing to locate a system, for instance in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean or the Siberian forest. It is another thing to be able to deliver a sufficiently destructive and accurate weapon against the targeted system before it is able to fire or conceal itself.
STABILIZING U.S.-Russian relations requires actions along each of these three pathways, conducted in parallel. Shaping and managing the overall relationship is fundamentally important. But whatever the course of U.S.-Russian relations in the future, there will remain a possibility (one, we argue, that is growing over time) of sliding into crisis and even armed conflict. Moreover, if a crisis or conflict does occur, there is a possibility (also growing over time) that escalation to strategic attack could occur. The following recommendations seek to manage these risks by helping shape the ongoing debate regarding U.S.-Russian relations and guide actions affecting U.S. nuclear posture, ballistic-missile defenses, cyber deterrence and space resilience. The recommendations also address the American role in NATO and NATO-Russia relations, both of which are of critical importance to all three pathways.
To safeguard American interests in the face of Russian actions, the Trump administration should begin by articulating a clear policy on Russia, in close coordination with Congress and NATO allies. In the absence of a coherent American approach, Russian leaders are less likely to cooperate on common interests, since Russian advocates of cooperation will wonder whether the United States will reverse itself and make them appear naive. Russian leaders are also less likely to be deterred, as advocates of a more aggressive approach can argue credibly that Russia should take advantage of a window of incoherence in Washington. And of fundamental importance, in the absence of a clear U.S. policy, Russian leaders are more likely to miscalculate how the United States will respond in a crisis—and, if a crisis does occur, be more likely to miscommunicate.
A clear U.S. policy toward Russia should include sanctions in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its continued military intervention in Ukraine, and its meddling in U.S. and European elections. The absence of painful and sustained costs would prompt Putin and his leadership coterie to conclude that they have little to fear from Washington and its allies, as long as there is the thinnest patina of deniability. At the same time, however, the United States should clarify for Moscow what actions it can take (or avoid taking) over a given period of time to achieve relief from sanctions. Unconditional—or poorly conditioned—sanctions would leave Russia with little incentive to alter threatening behavior.
In addition, the United States should respond with military deployments to Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This should include strengthening America’s nonnuclear long-range strike capabilities in Europe and supporting its partners’ efforts to do so as well. Washington should also work with NATO allies to continue to improve missile defenses in Europe. It should make clear that EPAA deployment, along with other missile-defense capabilities, will have a role in deterring Russia’s use of missiles in Europe, while reaffirming that EPAA deployments in Romania and Poland will still be unable to engage Russian ICBMs aimed at the United States. The U.S. response to Russia’s INF violation should further include the deployment of a follow-on to the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile–Nuclear (TLAM-N), built with stealth features based on the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) nuclear cruise missile. This follow-on to TLAM-N would fill a deterrence gap by adding a survivable and credible theater nuclear deterrent that complements dual-capable fighter-bombers (potentially vulnerable both to preemptive attacks on air bases and to advanced air defenses) and dual-capable long-range bombers (the use of which, if in response to theater use of nuclear weapons by Russia, would require the United States to be the first to engage in homeland-to-homeland nuclear strikes).
Finally, the United States should continue to develop areas of cooperation with Russia. Washington will need Russian support for (or abstention on) further U.N. Security Council–imposed sanctions on North Korea, and likely other threats to international peace and security that come before the council in the future. The two might productively cooperate in some areas of the Arctic, in civilian space activities, in diplomatic negotiations over Syria’s future and in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which Russia and the United States cochair. Even as American leaders continue to press a modest, positive agenda, they should put greater priority on deterring bad behavior and avoiding a slide toward crisis and conflict.
THE UNITED States should take additional steps to mitigate the potential for attacks in cyberspace and outer space to trigger rapid, uncontrolled escalation. One of the first steps should be to define its desired rules of the road for cyberspace and outer space, not only in peacetime, but also in crisis and conflict. It should then seek consensus with key allies and partners, with whom a common understanding of preferred guidelines for offensive cyber and outer-space activities remains lacking. Armed with an allied consensus, Washington should test the degree to which arriving at a common view with Moscow (and, likely separately, Beijing) is possible. Even if the United States and Russia fail to reach a common view, well-prepared bilateral discussions regarding rules of the road in cyberspace and outer space would help clarify where various actions might fall on the escalation ladder, thereby reducing the risk that either side unwittingly takes actions viewed by the other as extremely threatening.
Next, following a framework offered in a Defense Science Board Task Force report on cyber deterrence, DOD should bolster cyber and space resilience for critical military capabilities in three ways. First, it should ensure the cyber and space resilience of the nuclear triad, and the “thin line” of NC3 systems that supports it even in a nuclear exchange. Second, the department should ensure the essential cyber and space resilience to support a select but substantial subset of nonnuclear long-range strike capabilities, such as the new B-21 bomber and JASSM-ER and attack submarines equipped with conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles. Having punishing nonnuclear strike options available for response even after withstanding the other side’s best efforts at cyber and space attacks would significantly decrease the incentive to conduct such an attack, without requiring the president to escalate to a nuclear response. Third, DOD should ensure that select offensive cyber (and, if applicable, offensive counterspace) capabilities are highly resistant to both cyber and counterspace attacks, so that the United States may respond in kind to an attack limited to cyberspace and outer space.
The United States should also improve the digital resilience of its critical infrastructure. A focused national effort sustained over a period of many years could fundamentally reduce the cyber vulnerability of at least the most essential U.S. critical infrastructure, including the electrical grid, key elements of the financial sector, water and wastewater systems, and the electoral system. There will be no quick fixes, but with strong leadership from both the public and private sectors, the United States could substantially reduce the digital vulnerabilities of select portions of its critical infrastructure over the next ten to twenty years. By addressing these vulnerabilities, Washington can reduce Russia’s incentives to attack and the potential escalatory impact if it does so.
In addition—and critically—the United States should reopen diplomatic and military lines of communication with Russia. These channels are crucial for reducing the risks of miscommunication and avoidable conflict. Notwithstanding how difficult U.S.-Russian relations are today, the United States should work to reopen channels of communication, including diplomatic as well as military-to-military ones. Some initial steps—for example, tactical deconfliction in Syria—have taken place already, but much more is needed.
JUST AS the integration of a range of new technologies is undermining strategic stability, so too is an integrated program necessary to buttress strategic stability between the United States and Russia in the coming years and decades. This program must consider changes in both nuclear and nonnuclear systems, and in both nuclear and nonnuclear strategies.
As a first step in such a program, the United States should adopt a “triad-plus” strategic force structure. This means proceeding with the Columbia-class strategic submarine modernization program, B-21 dual-capable bomber program, and LRSO missile program. It also means that, rather than pursuing a one-for-one replacement of Minuteman III ICBMs in underground silos, the United States should develop a replacement ICBM that is significantly lighter than the Minuteman III and deploy perhaps two or three hundred of the missiles in silos. The United States should also initiate a mobile ICBM research-and- development program, including prototypes, so that the United States can shift weight to a mobile ICBM force in the event of a Russian breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare (ASW). Remanufacturing a stealthy version of the TLAM-N would also allow the United States to hedge against Russian ASW improvements.
At the same time, the Department of Defense should address vulnerabilities in NC3 systems and review launch-under-attack postures. DOD should invest first in ensuring that its nuclear forces and NC3 are highly resilient to a top-tier cyber adversary. Next, both the U.S. and Russian leadership must understand the reality that their NC3 systems could suffer some degradations in crisis or conflict—some of which may not be due to attacks by the other side; a third party might attempt a false-flag operation. Accidents and acts of nature can also cause service disruptions of some systems. Both sides should ensure that their planning and exercises account for such events. Finally, the U.S. and Russian postures to be prepared to launch ICBMs under attack deserve careful review, so as to minimize the risk of launching on false warning. How both sides can adjust their postures to this effect remains difficult to say. It is important to note, however, that the more the United States hedges through other means (e.g., TLAM-N and mobile ICBMs) in the future, the less pressure there will be to launch ICBMs under the warning of attack.
As the United States proceeds with a program of nuclear modernization, it should also develop and deploy nonnuclear hypersonic weapons, tailored to defeat major improvements in the air-defense systems of potential U.S. adversaries. The United States should aim for a “sweet spot” for nonnuclear hypersonic weapons in terms of military effectiveness (high), cost (relatively low), potential for high-volume strikes (significant) and impact on strategic stability (low). Medium-range ballistic missiles (with and without boost-glide vehicles) and hypersonic cruise missiles, launched from heavy bombers and/or attack submarines, could fall in this sweet spot. The systems would have a low impact on strategic stability because their infrared and other signatures would be substantially different and distinguishable from those of U.S. nuclear-delivery systems (including SLBMs and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles), attacks on one nation would not require overflight of others, and these systems would either lack the range to attack deep into Russia (the case for submarine-based medium-range systems) or would be unable to do so in volume without creating a massive detectable signature (the case for bomber-based systems).
The United States should also invest in its missile-defense architecture. To start, as North Korea improves its nuclear-tipped ICBM capabilities, the United States should continue to grow its missile defenses. Second, the United States should continue to press forward with directed-energy systems for defensive purposes. Priority should be given to helping to deal with the immediate challenge of negating North Korean long-range and medium-range missiles, likely by deploying directed-energy systems on manned or unmanned aircraft. Third, the United States should forswear space-based missile defense interceptors and directed-energy systems, strongly urge Russia to do the same and pursue a bilateral agreement with Russia (and, separately, a bilateral agreement with China) to this end. Because of the massive and immediate threat that such systems would pose to American satellites and their essential support to warfighting—and potentially to early warning and secure communications satellites that are vital to the U.S. nuclear deterrent—any Russian deployment of space-based missile defense interceptors or lasers would pose an immediate and unacceptable threat.
Finally, the United States should regularize strategic-stability talks with Russia and seek to extend the New START treaty by five years. The U.S.-Russian meeting in Finland in September 2017 was an important first step toward a regular Track 1 dialogue on strategic stability issues in the coming years. The American and Russian governments should sustain these sorts of efforts. At the same time, however, in view of the volatility of U.S.-Russian relations at this time, and recognizing that circumstances may delay or derail Track 1 efforts, both parties should pursue Track 2 and Track 1.5 dialogues on strategic stability. Extending New START would serve strategic stability through its verification provisions, which provide transparency and predictability, thereby reducing the propensity of each side to rely on worst-case assessments. It would not currently be helpful to press for further reductions in force levels, as having some extra margin above the bare minimum force levels that each side thinks it needs will help buffer the impact of new military capabilities as they are deployed.
THE UNITED States and Russia have reentered a period of serious tension that shows no sign of abating. Relations between the two sides appear likely to remain tense, if not hostile—at least through the medium term—and may involve considerable turbulence. Bluntly put, serious disagreement and even outright conflict are possible. Exacerbating this geopolitical reality, emerging new military capabilities—cyber, space, missile defense, long-range strike and (cutting through all) autonomous systems—are increasing uncertainties associated with strategic stability. Unless measures are taken to cushion the consequences of these military trends, conflict may become more probable and escalation more dramatic and severe than they need to be—all in an era when both crisis and conflict are more plausible than they were just ten years ago. If adopted by the Trump administration and its successors, a fresh American approach to U.S.-Russian relations will protect American and allied interests. If the U.S. approach is also articulated clearly and is consistent over time, it may well reduce the risk of crisis or conflict arising from Russian miscalculation.
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